In the wake of the settlement of the Oslo Accords in 1993, billions were pledged and disbursed by international donors in support of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. As a result, the international community had a large stake in the maintenance of the fragile attempts at peace in the Middle East. In "Building a State under Occupation", Husam Zomlot assesses the reasons why, despite this outpouring of international aid into the situation, the Oslo Accords ultimately failed. By focusing on donors and the political economy of peacebuilding and reconstruction, Zomlot highlights the assumptions which inform policy-making when attempting to mediate conflict. He therefore suggests that, in addition to a lack of appropriate political will, the international community gravely misread the political realities in both sides, particularly Israel's intentions with regards to the final outcome. This exploration of the realities of peacebuilding aid will therefore be of interest not only to researchers of Development Studies, Conflict Resolution and Political Economy, but also to policymakers and practitioners in the field.

Author Biography

Husam Zomlot is Scholar in Residence (Research Fellow) in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He holds a PhD in Economics from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.