This book explores the politics of fiscal authority, focusing on the centralization of taxation in Latin America during the twentieth century. The book studies this issue in great detail for the case of Mexico. The political (and fiscal) fragmentation associated with civil war at the beginning of the century was eventually transformed into a highly centralized regime. The analysis shows that fiscal centralization can best be studied as the consequence of a bargain struck between self-interested regional and national politicians. Fiscal centralization was more extreme in Mexico than in most other places in the world, but the challenges and problems tackled by Mexican politicians were not unique. The book thus analyzes fiscal centralization and the origins of intergovernmental financial transfers in the other Latin American federal regimes, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. The analysis sheds light on the factors that explain the consolidation of tax authority in developing countries.
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros is an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University, California. He previously taught at the University of California, Los Angeles. He received his MA and PhD in political science from Duke University, North Carolina. His dissertation won the award for best dissertation granted by the political economy section of the American Political Science Association. Diaz-Cayeros has published articles in the Journal of Theoretical Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Politica y Gobierno and several edited volumes.