Excerpt from Life of John C. Calhoun: Presenting a Condensed History of Political Events From 1811 to 1843 The Constitution has vested the Senate with the right of determining the rules of its proceedings, and of punishing members for disorderly conduct, which may extend even to expulsion. The great Object of giving the power to estab lish rules is to preserve order. The only effectual means Of preserving order is to prescribe by rules what shall be a violation of order, and to enforce the same by adequate punishment. The Senate alone has these powers by the Constitution: consequently, the Senate alone has the right of enforcing order; and, consequently, whatever right the Vice-president possesses over order, must be derived from the Senate; and, therefore, he can exercise no power in adopting rules or enforcing them, but what has been delegated to him by the Senate, and only to the extent, both in manner and matter, to which the power has been delegated. The particular power in question not having been dele gated, cannot be exercised by the Vice-president, and, consequently, he is not responsible. DO you not perceive the irresistible force with which your own mode of reasoning applies to the substantial constitutional powers Of the Senate, and how partial and absurd your arguments in favour Of the inferred constitu tional power of its presiding oflicer must appear in contrast with it? As absurd as it now appears, it shall be, if possible, infinitely more so before I have closed this part of the investigation. With the same predilection, your assumptions are all on the side of uncon trolled and unlimited power. Without proof, or even an attempt at it, you as sume that the power in controversy is inherent in the Vice president, and that he possesses it ex vi termini, as presiding officer Of the Senate. N ow I, who have certainly as much right to assume as yourself, deny that he possesses any such power and what may, perhaps, startle a mind organized like yours, I af firm that, as a presiding Officer, he has no inherent power whatever, unless that of doing what the Senate may prescribe by its rules be such a power. There are, indeed, inherent powers, but they are in the body, and not in the ofiicer. He is a mere agent to execute the will of the former. He can exercise no power which he does not hold by delegation, either express or implied. He stands in the same relation to the body, or assembly over which he presides, that a magistrate in a republic does to the state, and it would be as absurd to at tribute to the latter inherent powers as to the former. This, in fact, was once a fashionable doctrine. There was a time when minions of power thought it monstrous that all Of the powers of rulers should be derived from so low and filthy a source as the people whom they govern. A deeper and holier found ation of power was sought, and that was proclaimed to be in the inherent, divine right of rulers and, as their powers were thus shown to be inde pendent Of the will of the people, it followed that any attempt on their part to divest rulers of power would be an act of such violence as would be disobey ed as illegal and contemned as ridiculous. I might trace the analogy between your language and principles and those Of the advocate Of despotic power in all ages and countries much farther, but I deem it not necessary either to weaken or refute your arguments. A more direct and decisive reply may be given. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com