This is an extremely impressive and comprehensive late 2018 report. Based on historical lessons learned from irregular warfare case studies, and internal organizational analysis, this thesis seeks to provide Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) with specific implementable recommendations based on Edward Luttwak's concept of relational maneuver. Luttwak defines relational maneuver as a style of warfare that requires a deep understanding of the threat and its operational environment to identify vulnerabilities, adapt, and exploit those weaknesses to destroy the enemy as a system. Luttwak argues that irregular warfare requires effective implementation of relational maneuver to achieve operational and strategic success. The U.S. military's experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2009 through 2016 have revealed insufficient use of relational maneuver, favoring, instead, employment of attrition warfare, which focuses on optimizing internal organizational efficiency without understanding, or adapting to, the threat or the operational environment. Through this research, the authors seek to influence MARSOC's organizational strategy to more effectively wage irregular warfare. The final recommendations provide a possible path to MARSOC for overcoming institutional challenges inhibiting the employment of relational maneuver in irregular warfare.I. Introduction * II. Relational Maneuver: An Analytical Framework * III. Case Study: Vietnam, An Ineffective Evolution Toward Relational Maneuver * IV. El Salvador: "Not A Military War" * V. Afghanistan: "Still A Question Mark" * VI. SOF Advantages-Introduction * VII. Organizational Design and MARSOC * VIII. Synthesis, Analysis, And Recommendations * IX. Discoveries, Disclaimers, and Further Research * 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat AssessmentThe evidence suggests that the root of the U.S. military's strategic failures in irregular warfare lies in ineffective implementation of what modern strategist Edward Luttwak defines as relational maneuver. Relational maneuver is a style of warfare that focuses on studying a threat to identify and exploit vulnerabilities to achieve strategic success. This style of warfare requires a deep understanding of the threat and operational environment and the adaptation to exploit threat vulnerabilities. In irregular warfare, adaptation and exploitation must occur through both political and traditional military competition. The U.S. military, including SOF, disproportionally applies maneuver through traditional military violence rather than political competition.This study draws upon the strategic context outlined by the 2018 NDS, the projected prevalence of future irregular warfare, credible research on irregular warfare, historical U.S. military lessons, and internal organizational analysis to produce implementable recommendations to the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). These recommendations are intended to enhance MARSOC's ability to wage irregular warfare and influence successful strategic outcomes in line with the 2018 NDS. Three intermediate arguments underpin the final recommendations. First, irregular warfare is fundamentally more complex, dynamic, and uncertain than doctrinally defined traditional warfare due to political competition that occurs at every level of warfare. Second, U.S. military strategic success in irregular warfare requires applying relational maneuver, which enables the necessary understanding and adaptation to identify and exploit threat vulnerabilities in uncertain operational environments. Third, SOF and MARSOC need to better apply relational maneuver through both political competition and military violence.