In recent decades, resource-rich developing countries have been using their natural resources as collateral to access sources of finance for investment, countervailing the barriers they face when accessing conventional bank lending and capital markets. One of the financing models that have emerged as a result is the Resource Financed Infrastructure (RFI) model, a derivation of previous oil-backed lending models pioneered by several Western banks in Africa. Under a Resource Financed Infrastructure (RFI) arrangement, a loan for current infrastructure construction is securitized against the net present value of a future revenue stream from oil or mineral extraction. The model has been applied in several African countries, for a cumulative contract value of approximately 30 billion dollars, according to publically available sources. This report, provides an analytical discussion of resource-financed infrastructure (RFI) contracting from a project finance perspective. The report is meant as a forum for in-depth discussion and as a basis for further research into RFI's role, risks, and potential, without any intention to present a World Bank supported view on RFI contracting. It is motivated by the conviction that if countries are to continue to either seek RFI or receive unsolicited RFI proposals, there is an onus on public officials to discern bad deals from good, to judge unavoidable trade-offs, and to act accordingly. The report aims to provide a basis for developing insights on how RFI deals can be made subject to the same degree of public policy scrutiny as any other instrument through which a government of a low- or lower-middle-income country might seek to mobilize development finance