Excerpt from The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. 9: January December, 1912 T first sight nothing could seem more obvious than that things, individual blocks, exist. In fact that things exist as indi vidual and distinct has seemed far clearer to common sense than that minds are individual. We only have to recollect that Aristotle found mind (active nous) impersonal and universal, while the body, with the functions depending upon it, seemed to furnish the individual substrate, and that Thomas Aquinas makes the body the principle of individuation, without which human souls, like the angels, would merge into the genus. It is unnecessary to say that philosophy has changed front in this respect, and finds it comparatively easy to recognize the individuality of minds, while the independence and individuality of things has well-nigh disappeared in the general continuum. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.