This study examines the traditional interpretation of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Navy's quarantine of the island A bevy of Political scientists, and even a few historians, have complied and impressive literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis, but most accounts draw heavily on the memoirs of former Kennedy insiders, especially Robert Kennedy and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Based on recently declassified records and Interviews with participants, this study corrects some of the misinterpretation of naval operations, reveals new evidence about U.S.intelligence, and throws into doubt the Kennedy/Schlesinger account. Basedon intelligence gleaned from communications intercepts, Kennedy was alertedin early June t-o Soviet Premier Khrushchev's plan to deploy ballisticmissiles in Cuba. This intelligence was confirmed by the subsequent Sovietsealift effort, communications intercepts, and CIA agents on the island.Yet, Kennedy did little to prepare his administration to deal with thedilemma. He moved forcefully to restrict intelligence on the buildup, butdid nothing to prevent it. Kennedy moved only in mid-October when he hadirrefutable photographs of the missiles. He imposed a limited navalblockade around Cuba and coerced the Soviets to remove the missilesthrough frantic back-door diplomacy. This included a trade for AmericanJupiter missiles in Turkey. This study considers several issues relatedto the development of intelligence before and during the crisis, commandand control of naval operations, and the Navy's ASW operations.