In the wake of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the United States designated the Jihad al-Bina' organization in 2007 and its postwar recovery project Wa'ad in 2009 for its relationship with, and activities supporting, Lebanese Hezbollah. Because of this designation, Jihad al-Bina' and Wa'ad became subject to sanctions which, in theory, should have undermined their ability to support Hezbollah's strategic objectives by denying Jihad al-Bina' access to necessary resources and funding to execute projects. This thesis examines Jihad al-Bina's projects from 1988-2018 to determine how Jihad al-Bina' contributed to Hezbollah's strategic objectives. It also examines how U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina' in 2007 and its Wa'ad project in 2009 affected their ability to carry out that work. In detailing Jihad al-Bina's activities and projects during this time period, this thesis compares the number, nature and scale of projects executed by Jihad al-Bina' prior to and following U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina' in 2007 and 2009, respectively. This thesis found that these 2007 and 2009 sanctions were ineffective in the near- and long-term. The sanctions failed to deny Jihad al-Bina' resources necessary to conduct immediate postwar reconstruction and recovery. Moreover, Jihad al-Bina' expanded the size and scope of projects, and grew in size and legitimacy in the postwar era between 2009 and the present.I. Introduction * A. Major Research Question * B. Significance of the Research Question * C. Literature Review * D. Potential Explanations and Hypotheses * 1. First Hypothesis * 2. Second Hypothesis * E. Research Design * F. Thesis Overview And Chapter Outline * G. Conclusion * II. Jihad Al-Bina' From 1988 To 2007 * A. Introduction * B. Iranian Revolutionary Foreign Policy and the Formation of Hezbollah * 1. The Islamic Revolution and Iran's Revolutionary Ideology * 2. The Iran-Iraq War * 3. Exporting the Revolution to Lebanon * 4. Hezbollah and the Lebanese Civil War * C. Creation of Jihad Al-Bina' * 1. Jehad-e Sazandegi's Transfusion * 2. Foundations of Jihad al-Bina' * 3. Objectives * 4. Symbolism * 5. Hierarchy and Structure * D. Jihad Al-Bina' Development Foundation Activities 1988 To 2008 * 1. Initial Operations Repertoire during the Civil War * 2. Post-civil War Service Provision as a Territoriality Expansion and Power Consolidation Mechanism * 3. Jihad al-Bina' and Hezbollah's Entry into Politics * 4. Funding * E. The 2006 War With Israel and Wa'ad * 1. How it Began * 2. Extent of Damage * 3. Jihad al-Bina's Wa'ad Project * F. The 2007 U.S. Sanctions Against Hezbollah's Jihad Al-Bina' * G. Conclusion * III. Jihad Al-Bina' From 2007 To 2018 * A. U.S. Sanctions, Hezbollah's Jihad Al-Bina', And Iran * 1. A Brief History on Sanctions against Iran * 2. The UN Loses Gusto for Sanctions * 3. The U.S. Goes it Alone: An Innovation in Sanctions * 4. The UN Comes Around * 5. Sanctioning the Iran-Lebanon Nexus * B. Post-2006 War Jihad Al-Bina' Reconstruction * 1. The Wa'ad Project-Hezbollah's Pledge in Beirut's Southern Suburbs * 2. Jihad al-Bina's Wa'ad Takes the Lead in Reconstruction * 3. U.S. Sanctions and the Isolation of Jihad al-Bina and Wa'ad * 4. Wa'ad's Resistance Public Relations Campaign * 5. Results of the Wa'ad Project * 6. Southern Lebanon * 7. Northern Lebanon * C. The 2008 Lebanese Conflict And Hezbollah's Forced Integration * D. Postwar Normalization * E. Jihad Al-Bina' 2011 To 2018 * 1. Sunni Extremist Backlash to Hezbollah's Pro-Assad Activities in Syria * 2. Current Operations * F. Hizballah International Financial Prevention Acts (HIFPA) * G. Conclusion * IV. Conclusion * A. Summary Of Research * B. Findings * C. Testing the Hypotheses * D. Implications of Research and Suggestions for Further Research