This paper examines the defense organizational responses to the emergence of air and space as warfighting domains and, using these experiences as points of comparison, applies the same logic to consider the question: Should the Department of Defense create an independent US Cyber Force? The author determines that the Army Air Forces had achieved de facto independent status within the War Department by 1942, but airpower advocates continued to press for separation to more effectively advocate for budget share. In 1947 five forces aligned for the first time to support separating air forces from the army: airpower had proven successful in recent combat during World War II; the Army Air Forces had matured into an autonomous institution capable of independence; Army and War Department leadership actively supported a separate airpower service; vigorous Presidential support emerged for airpower to have organizational parity; and a comprehensive reorganization of nation's security apparatus was underway. In contrast, none of these factors were present when the Space Commission elected not to recommend the creation of an independent space force in 2001. With respect to cyber forces, only one of the five factors, broader national security reform, is partially met. As a result, creation of an independent cyber service appears unlikely in the near term.It took over 40 years of military experience with the air weapon and two global wars for the United States Congress to establish an independent United States Air Force. In the same way that organizational independence strengthened airpower, military space operations would benefit greatly from organizational differentiation, independent doctrine and leadership development, and tailored administrative support. The lack of a credible existential threat to national security from that domain, however, has hindered the effort to make the leap to an independent space corps or force. Finding an insufficient and incoherent cadre of space leaders and doctrine in 2001, the Space Commission nudged the Air Force bureaucracy down a path which may in the future be more conducive to organizational independence for space power.At present, none of the five critical factors for separation as identified analysis of Air Force independence align in favor of a separate cyber service. First, there is no recent record of cyberspace combat success that compares in scope or impact to that of airpower in World War II. Second, unlike the cohesive Army Air Forces which formed the corpus of the United States Air Force upon its creation in 1947, cyberspace forces today are spread throughout the four existing services.Third, none of the existing services has indicated a willingness to cede its role in the cyberspace mission, and the resources currently allocated to it, to form a cyber service. In contrast, Army and War Department leadership in 1947 actively supported the transfer of resources necessary to create the United States Air Force. Fourth, the President's cyberspace policy takes no position on the internal Department of Defense organizational construct; unlike in the case for airpower, when President Truman unequivocally advocated for a separate Air Force. The case for the fifth factor, comprehensive national security reorganization, is less straightforward. While several defense-reform efforts are presently underway in Congress with at least a modicum of support from the Defense Secretary, it is unclear if they will approach the transformative scope of the 1947 reorganization which birthed the Air Force. Nevertheless, with none of the other four factors aligned in favor of cyber independence at this time, creation of a cyber service appears highly unlikely in the near term.