Economic voting is a phenomenon that political scientists and economists can hardly overlook. There is ample evidence for a strong link between economic conditions and government popularity. However, not everything is that simple and this edited collection focuses on 'the comparative puzzle' of economic voting. It has proven impossible to identify stable vote or popularity functions in cross-country research or even within country over time. Recent trends in economic voting research concentrate on the role played by institutions and structural factors in the relationship between economic fluctuations and voting behaviour. Economic Voting suggests a new approach. The theoretical and empirical assessment of economic voting needs to account for the contextual effects of political institutions and voter heterogeneity. It emphasises the importance of comparative research design and argues that the psychology of the economic voter model needs to be developed further. Questions discussed include: * Why are economic vote and popularity functions so unstable? * What is the level of sophistication of the economic voter? * How do political institutions affect economic voting? * Can economic voting be explained with fundamental psychological variables, such as risk-aversion, limited rationality or emotional response? * Why did Al Gore lose the 2000 US Presidential Election while the economy was doing so well?