India continues to consider the nuclear option necessary on account of prestige, domestic technical and political impetus and security concerns. Dr Sidhu examines the 'carrot' approach of incentives, rather than the 'stick' approach of sanctions, as a possible means to change India's attitude to the nuclear option. The focus will be two-fold: what outcome do those imposing, and those receiving, these incentives expect, especially on dual-technology and security issues? what are the essential elements needed to enhance incentive-based cooperation? The author focuses on India and the US for two reasons: any incentive strategies must take into account the crucial relationship between the US and India on the nuclear issue; and, given India's dominant position in the region, successful engagement through incentives could cause Pakistan to follow suit. The author asserts that increased strategic cooperation is the ideal incentivebut it is unlikely in the near future. If Indian attitudes remain unchanged, Pakistan is unlikely to alter its proliferation behaviour.