How Did a Lack of Strategic and Operational Vision Impair the Army

By:

Paul Cook

Format:

Paperback / softback

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Description

When American combat forces were first deployed to Korea in 1950 the battlefield results were generally tactical defeats. The troops that were initially deployed came from occupation duty in Japan and were not prepared for combat operations. In this thesis, the causes of tactical failure are examined. The cumulative effects of executive decisions, service department decisions, and the decisions of the operational headquarters, the Eighth United States Army, served to create the conditions for battlefield results in the summer of 1950. Drawing on a range of primary and secondary source material, this thesis examines the decisions of each of these echelons and evaluates the effects of these decisions through four case studies. These studies represent two regiments from the 24th Infantry Division, one regiment from the 25th Infantry Division and one regiment from the 1st Cavalry Division. These studies represent one-third of the regiments deployed to Korea in the initial stages of the war.

Release date Australia

September 13th, 2012

Author

Paul Cook

Audience

General (US: Trade)

Illustrations

illustrations

Pages

162

Dimensions

189x246x9

ISBN-13

9781249367581

Product ID

21219167

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