This study proposes the preeminence of disengagement in US national military strategy. The author first assesses the place disengagement holds in the realm of strategy, concluding that the term is misunderstood and underappreciated. Next, the author examines why this negative connotation of disengagement exists. "Mini-case studies," in the form of US military interventions since World War II, examine various approaches to disengagement to find what was tried and the results. Examining historical disengagement efforts and missed opportunities through the lenses of the Cold War and the New World Order, the author explores various barriers to disengagement which exist within the US national security apparatus. By coupling the practical, historical examination of the mini-cases with the theoretical analysis of organizational barriers, the author finds common misperceptions that further hinder disengagement. All these factors combined lead to a propensity for US military and civilian policymakers to overextend the military. In the end, the author finds that a national military strategy of disengagement best supports the expansive national security strategies of the New World Order. Making such a strategy feasible requires the national security apparatus to be completely reengineered from its Cold War framework.