Throughout American military history, conventional forces have often relied on unconventional or militia forces to support their operational and tactical objectives. The use of militias in warfare has proven relevant and viable from the early American colonial period through current conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The American experience with militia forces is not unique but has been replicated and adopted to varying degrees of success by international militaries as well. Despite the important, and sometimes central, role that militias have played throughout history, the use of militia forces receives little mention in our formal military doctrine. This work will examine several historical accounts of how militias were employed in the Southern Campaigns during the American Revolutionary War; identify important lessons learned from each period, and offer recommendations for how to institutionalize the militia concept for inclusion into formal military doctrine. Although American and international military history is replete with examples of irregular and conventional force cooperation, the period examined in this essay is limited to the American Revolution. Specifically, it will examine lessons learned during the American and British Southern Campaign in 1780 and 1781. The vast mix of partisan, unconventional, and conventional warfare fought by the American and British militaries in the southern colonies provides sufficient scope to thoroughly examine the topic. In order for doctrine to fully encapsulate common warfighting principles based on historical experience, it must include the planning and employment of irregular forces.