Organizational disasters destroy not only lives but also reputations, resources, legitimacy and trust. The failures of electricity networks, the outbreak of epidemic diseases, the malfunctioning of intelligence services before 9/11, and corporate financial scandals are distressing reminders of how things can go wrong, particularly in large, and often highly regarded, social systems. Tragic events like the Columbia disaster afford opportunities for reflection, learning and improvement. Although we embrace new technologies eagerly, we are reluctant to accept the risks of innovation. Moreover, some technologies and organizations may be too complex to control effectively. Why is it that some organizations are relatively immune to failure and others are more prone to accidents? Do the very measures that are taken to increase safety contribute to accidents? Finally, can societies, organizations, and individuals learn from failures and reduce or remove dangers? Against this backdrop, Professors Bill Starbuck and Moshe Farjoun at New York University's Stern School of Management have invited a diverse group of experts to contribute to an edited volume about the Columbia accident and the organizational lessons that can be learned from it. During the process of gathering contributions to the book they found out that other individuals, some of whom helped the Investigation Board with its report, have wanted to write about the disaster. The book thus gradually became the focus of a coordinated effort spanning many experts, institutions and academic specialties, to understand step by step the complex factors that led to disaster. It tackles vital issues such as the role of time pressures and goal conflict in decision making, and the impediments for effective learning; Questions how organizational risk is managed and how technological and organizational complexities interact; And assesses how large, medium, and small organizations can, and in fact must, increase their resilience.