The societal benefits of takeovers - in the form of enhanced competition and productivity - have been well documented. Moreover, many scholars believe that the very possibility of a hostile takeover urges incumbent management to be more productive, thus ultimately enhancing shareholder welfare. Starting from such premises as these, Dr Forstinger offers an in-depth comparative analysis of takeover law as it exists in the United States and as it is currently developing in Europe. The latter emphasizes the failed takeover directive of 2001, as its content is already determining new proposals currently in preparation. Among the salient topics that arise in the course of the discussion are the following: the conflicting interests of the various stakeholders-shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, governments, "raiders", and others; the state competition question from the US perspective and the prospects of a market for incorporations in the EU; the tension between harmonization and regulatory competition in context with takeover laws; and the focus on current takeover regulation in the UK, Germany and Austria. The study concludes with recommendations for reflexive harmonization of takeover law in the European Union responding to the complex needs of the diverse corporate law systems of the member states. All company lawyers and corresponding regulators - especially but not exclusively in Europe - should appreciate the clear scholarship and thought that are apparent in this book.