What is the World Trade Organisation? Does it represent a new constitution for the international economic order? Will it curb international trade discrimination and open up markets for developing countries, or will it prevent states from choosing the economic systems they want? Is it participatory, transparent, and accountable enough to be characterized as a constitution? This book untangles the debates about constitutionalization. Cass explores the contemporary development of institutional forms and democratic ideas associated with constitutionalism within the world trading system. This book examines the constitutionalization enthusiasts who promote institutions, management techniques, rights discourse and judicial-type power to construct a constitution for the WTO. It also studies constitutional sceptics who fear the effects of constitutionalization upon the autonomy of states, on the capacity of the WTO to consider non-economic and non-free-trade goals, and on democratic processes at the WTO and in the nation-state. Cass argues that the WTO is not, and should not be described as, a constitution either by the standards of any conventional definition, or by the lights of any constitution to which we ought to aspire. Under current models, a constitutionalized WTO may curtail the ability of states to decide matters of national economic interest. The WTO lacks a proper political structure to balance the work of its judicial bodies. The risk is an emphasis upon economic goals and free trade theory over other social values. Instead, Cass argues that what is needed is a constitutionalized WTO which is more democratic and representative: one that considers the economic development needs of states and takes account of the skewed playing field of international trade and its effect on the economic prospects of developing countries. In short, trading democracy, and not trading constitutionalization, is the biggest challenge facing the WTO.